RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY: THE COGNITIVE
PENETRABILITY OF RELIGIOUS PERCEPTION
Hamid Vahid

Philosophical responses to religious diversity range from outright rejection
of divine reality to claims of religious pluralism. In this paper, I challenge
those responses that take the problem of religious diversity to be merely an
instance of the general problem of disagreement. To do so, I will take, as my
starting point, William Alston’s treatment of the problems that religious diversity seems to pose for the rationality of theistic beliefs. My main aim is to
highlight the cognitive penetrability of religious experience as a major source
of such problems. I conclude by examining the consequences of cognitive
penetration for the reliability of the monotheistic doxastic practice.

My aim in this paper is to address a neglected difficulty for the rationality
of religious belief: the cognitive penetrability of religious experience. My
main contention is that recent discussions of the rationality of religious
belief have heavily focused on the output side of the religious belief formation—epistemic consequences of religious diversity—at the cost of
ignoring its input side—for example, the experiences on the basis of which
religious belief is formed. If it turns out that religious experience can be
cognitively penetrated, this will have serious implications for the epistemic
significance of religious diversity. The cognitive penetrability thesis says
that just as perceptual experiences influence our beliefs and desires, our
cognitive states can also affect our perceptual experiences by causally
influencing them in an internal way. Accordingly, an agent’s background
states can influence the content of her perceptual experiences. This means
that experiences can have rationally assessable etiologies which, under
certain circumstances, can downgrade their epistemic force. The cognitive
penetrability thesis equally holds for religious experiences, and so the
suggestion is that, in addition to the standard ways in which religious diversity is said to threaten the rationality of religious belief, one should also
look to the phenomenon of cognitive penetration as another significant
source of that threat.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 1, after some introductory
remarks, I elaborate on the bearing of the input/output distinction on the
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question of the epistemic significance of religious diversity, followed by
some general observations about the phenomenon of cognitive penetration and its relevance to that question. To emphasize this point, and to
connect to the literature on the subject of religious diversity, I shall examine, in Section 2, some shortcomings of William Alston’s response to the
issue of religious diversity while also highlighting his recognition of the
epistemic relevance of the input side to religious belief, namely, religious
experience to its rationality. Section 3 explains how the phenomenon of
cognitive penetration can be seen as a significant source of the threat to the
rationality of religious belief presented by religious diversity. I conclude
by examining the consequences of cognitive penetration for the reliability
of the monotheistic doxastic practice.
1. Religious Diversity and Its Possible Epistemic Consequences
According to some well-known accounts of the epistemology of religious
belief, just as we can talk about the justification of perceptual beliefs in
terms of the reliability of the practices of forming beliefs on the basis of
sensory experience (SP), we can also talk about the rationality of beliefs
that result from belief-forming practices that involve religious or “mystical” experience (MP).1 Accordingly, the question of whether the beliefs
produced by MP are justified turns, at least in part, on the question
whether MP is reliable. Despite their initial similarities, however, SP has
features that are lacking in the case of MP, features that, though failing to
establish SP’s reliability, are nevertheless signs that it is a reliable practice.
There is, in particular, a feature of SP whose absence seems to poses a
serious problem for the claim about the rationality of engaging in MP. The
feature in question concerns the fact that people, no matter which culture they belong to, make use of the same conceptual schemes to objectify
the content of their sense experience. But when it comes to MP, we find
ourselves confronted with a plurality of incompatible mystical doxastic
practices which often yield incompatible doxastic outputs in virtue of invoking different conceptual schemes.
This is, of course, an instance of the well-known problem of religious
diversity, and it appears to undermine the reliability of MP. Consider, for
example, the different ways in which Buddhists, Muslims and Christians
express their experience of encountering God, or the Ultimate, in their
lives. Accordingly, we will have to recognize as many mystical doxastic
practices as there are different conceptual schemes. The existing responses
to the problem of religious diversity constitute a spectrum from skeptical,
anti-realist to realist, religion-friendly explanations as to why diversity
obtains. An extremely skeptical response states that the best explanation
of diversity is that there is no objective reality with which people strive
to come into contact. A less extreme skeptical way of responding to the
problem is to see religious diversity as arising not from the absence of any
For example, Alston, Perceiving God.
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objective reality but from the unreliability of MP. The end result, however,
is the same: Religious beliefs are epistemically unjustified.
Two major trends emerge from the realist, religious-friendly responses:
exclusivism and religious pluralism. An exclusivist is someone who thinks
that the religious perspective of only one basic theistic system is the truth
or is closer to the truth than all its rivals.2 A religious pluralist, on the other
hand, denies that any theistic system enjoys a privileged position vis-a-vis
truth but also suggests a positive account by which to explain religious
diversity. Inspired by the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal
and the noumenal, John Hick, for example, has proposed to distinguish
between the Real (or the Ultimate) and the various ways in which it is experienced and to which people respond within various cultural systems.3
Just as for Kant the noumenal world exists independently of our conceptions of it, the Real is also an independently existing being which appears
differently depending on which conceptual scheme or cultural tradition
one utilizes to grasp it. But, as a number of philosophers have pointed
out, it is far from clear that Hick can consistently claim that the Real can
be experienced through our religious concepts while maintaining, at the
same time, that it is “the unexperiencable ground of that realm [of human
experience].”4 Hick, then, succeeds in diminishing the impact of religious
diversity on the rationality of religious beliefs only at the cost of radically
restructuring their contents.
Religious diversity can challenge the rationality of religious belief in
a number of ways. Some of these challenges are epistemic while others
involve non-epistemic considerations. In the first group, one can mention
the challenge from religious disagreement (to be discussed later). There
is also the probabilistic challenge from religious pluralism which holds
that if, say, a Christian takes his Trinitarian belief to be more probable
than each of the alternatives in other religions, the combined probability
of these alternatives still outweigh that of the belief held by him.5 Another
challenge concerns the common thought that religious beliefs are highly
contingent depending on factors (e.g., who our parents are, which people
we have met in life, which culture we were brought up in, etc.) that are
not truth-conducive. So we could have easily ended up having different
religious beliefs.6 There is also the non-epistemic “explanatory” challenge
2
It has, for example, been claimed that a Christian can reasonably ignore the claims of
other religions unless it can be proved objectively that the upholders of such claims are on
equal epistemic footing, that is, that they are his or her epistemic peers (Plantinga, Warranted
Christian Belief). In response, it has been objected that one can also move in the opposite
direction by shifting the burden of proof to the exclusivist and claim that practitioners of
other religions are epistemic peers unless the exclusivist can demonstrate objectively that
this is not the case.
3
Hick, An Interpretation of Religion.
4
Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 242.
5
Schellenberg, “Pluralism and Probability.” For a reply see Plantinga, Warranted Christian
Belief.
6
See, for example, Bogardus, “The Problem of Contingency.”
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which is more concerned with the origins of diversity. The idea is that
once it is assumed that a particular religious view is true and that God
wants everyone to believe that view, we face the question of why there are
so many competing religions in the world.7
All of these accounts of the challenge religious diversity for the rationality of religious belief have something in common: their heavy focus on
the output side of the religious belief formation, the beliefs. What they
seem to neglect is its input side. Consider one prominent sort of input: religious experience. To explain, recall that mystical perceptual practice (MP)
was articulated as the practice of forming output beliefs about the Ultimate
in response to inputs to the practice consisting of the experiential awareness of the Ultimate. Depending on where the emphasis is laid, either on
the output side or the input side, the problem of religious diversity would
assume different kinds of significance. If we focus merely on the output
side of various forms of MP, highlighting their doxastic incompatibility,
then religious diversity will be best viewed as an instance of the general
problem of disagreement. If, on the other hand, emphasis is laid on the
input side, religious experience, then the problem assumes a whole new
dimension. And it seems that it is the input side that distinguishes MP
from SP. After all, disagreement is also rife in SP.
This point is also noted by Alston who, when highlighting how MP
differs from SP, points out that “whereas SP presents virtually an identical
picture in these respects [subject matter, conceptual scheme and overriding
system] across cultures, this is by no means the case with MP.”8 Alston
particularly singles out the role of conceptual schemes in objectifying the
content of mystical perceptual experience. While our perceived environment is, for the most part, conceptualized in the same way by people from
different cultural backgrounds, adherents of various religious traditions
differ enormously in their depictions of Ultimate Reality.
Now, if it turns out that one’s antecedently held religious beliefs (and
emotions, etc.) can infiltrate one’s religious experiences, this might impact
the epistemic status of the resulting beliefs (which can either be new or
updated beliefs). When experiences are thus affected, they are said to be
cognitively penetrated. The phenomenon of cognitive penetration has received a lot of attention in recent epistemology. Its significance is best seen
in the context of the foundationalist accounts of the structure of perceptual justification and their distinction between basic and non-basic beliefs
with the former acquiring their justified status directly from experience.
Although the distinction between basic and nonbasic beliefs helps to bring
the regress of justification to an end, it also underscores the question of
how basic beliefs acquire their justification from non-doxastic states like
perceptual experience.

Marsh and Marsh, “The Explanatory Challenge of Religious Diversity.”
Alston, Perceiving God, 188.
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A popular recent view of the conditions of perceptual justification,
known as “dogmatism,” holds that the justification conditions of perceptual beliefs merely involve experiences with the same content.9 The
dogmatist view has, however, come under fire due to the (alleged) cases
of cognitive penetration of perceptual experience.10 The cognitive penetrability thesis says that just as perceptual experiences influence our beliefs
and desires, our cognitive states can also affect our perceptual experiences
by causally influencing them in an internal way (in the sense of being
contained entirely within the subject). It is further claimed that cognitive
penetration downgrades the epistemic status of perceptual experience,
thereby diminishing its justificatory power.
Focusing on the phenomenon of cognitive penetration can illuminate
an important angle on the epistemic significance of religious diversity that
the aforementioned accounts have ignored. To motivate the relevance of
the phenomenon of cognitive penetration to the debate, I shall examine
Alston’s response to the challenge of religious diversity and show why
it falls short. Such a detour is instructive because, while Alston clearly
recognizes the importance of the input side of the religious belief formation to the question of the epistemic significance of religious diversity, he
chooses, in his account, to focus instead on the output beliefs, thus, failing
to bring out the epistemic implications of his insight.
2. Alston’s Response to the Problem of Religious Diversity:
The Significance of the Input
Alston’s main claim is that it is rational to engage in MP while acknowledging that we have no non-question-begging grounds for determining
which particular form of MP is reliable. He points out, however, that
while there is a common procedure for deciding between the competing
alternatives in intra-practices in SP, such as weather prediction, there is no
such procedure in the inter-practice case of MP where distinct perceptual
doxastic practices not only differ in terms of their conceptual schemes but
also in their doxastic outputs. This asymmetry between intra-practice and
inter-practice cases shows that there is no reason why, say, a Christian
should lose her justification for her pertinent religious beliefs in the face
of an unresolved incompatibility. Alston emphasizes, however, that what
grounds the justification of such beliefs is not just the mere fact that various forms of MP have not been shown to be unreliable.
To explain, he notes that just as the practitioners of SP, which has proved
itself by its “fruits,” namely, enabling the perceivers to deal competently
with their environment, are justified to continue forming perceptual
beliefs accordingly, even if they lack non-question-begging grounds for
9
See, for example, Pryor, “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist” and Huemer, “Compassionate
Phenomenal Conservatism.”
10
See, for example, Siegel, “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification” and “The
Epistemic Impact.”
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showing their accuracy, so are the practitioners of MP when forming their
appropriate beliefs. Take someone who uses Christian practices of basing
beliefs on mystical experiences (CMP) to form her Christian M-beliefs. It
would be rational for her to do so if, as it turns out, CMP receives significant
forms of self-support in terms of the fulfillment of God’s promises within
that practice such as growth in sanctity, peace, love and other “fruits of
the spirit.”
It seems questionable, however, that Alston’s introduction of the
self-support factor, understood in terms of the practical payoffs of religious beliefs, can help such beliefs sustain an epistemically rational status.
At best, the payoffs of such practices confer practical rationality or justification on their doxastic outputs. Indeed, in an earlier part of his book,
Alston emphasizes that he is “taking significant self-support to function
as a way of a strengthening the prima facie claim of a doxastic practice to
a kind of practical rationality, rather than as something that confers probability on a claim to reliability.”11 It is thus puzzling that, in the chapter on
religious diversity, he seems to think that he has established the epistemic
rationality of religious beliefs:
Given the “payoffs” of the Christian life of the sort just mentioned, one may
quite rationally continue to hold that CMP does serve as a genuine cognitive
access to Ultimate Reality, and a trustworthy guide to that Reality’s relation
to ourselves, even if one cannot see how to solve the problem of religious
pluralism.12

Still more puzzling is the fact that, by Alston’s own admission, only one
form of MP is genuinely reliable. If so, it is not clear how Alston could
claim that it is possible to rationally engage in all such practices in an
epistemic sense of that word. What has gone wrong?
The first thing to note is that, despite recognizing the important role of
conceptual schemes in shaping and objectifying the content of mystical
experience, in his official account of the epistemic significance of religious
diversity, Alston chooses to focus on the output beliefs and their “internal
support.” But, if that is where the emphasis is to be laid, there would seem
to be an easier route to establishing Alston’s desired conclusion, namely,
by seeing the problem posed by religious diversity as a special case of
the more general problem of disagreement. Indeed there are passages in
Alston’s book chapter on religious diversity where he appears to see the
problem as a problem of (religious) disagreement. For example, he says
that “any genuine cognitive contact with reality will yield agreement,
and we can measure its reliability by the extent of agreement.”13 Or, more
pointedly, to show how religious diversity might diminish the rationality
of engaging in CMP, he gives an example in which different people give
Alston, Perceiving God, 174.
Alston, Perceiving God, 276. Note that having “genuine cognitive access to Ultimate Reality” constitutes an epistemic context.
13
Alston, Perceiving God, 267.
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conflicting sense-perceptual report of a car accident where there is no neutral ground on which to decide which account is correct. He then notes the
following:
[A particular eyewitness who] is confronted by several accounts that diverge from hers should drastically reduce her confidence in her own. Here it
seems clear that the existence of these uneliminated conflicting alternatives
nullifies whatever justification she otherwise would have had for believing
that the accident was as she took it to be.14

Indeed, Alston’s defense of the rationality of engaging in CMP can be seen
to parallel a particular argument for a similar position in the disagreement
controversy.
The fundamental questions in the disagreement debate consist of
whether we can reasonably maintain our beliefs after becoming fully
aware of each other’s views, and, further, whether we can also have mutually recognized disagreement.15 Current responses to these questions have,
in general, formed a spectrum at one end of which sit the so-called “conciliatory” views and at whose other end are the “steadfast” views.16 While
the conciliatory views require us to make doxastic conciliation when faced
with an epistemic peer who holds a different stance on a particular subject,
the steadfast views allow us to maintain our confidence in our relevant
beliefs. It is arguable that intellectual humility requires that the steadfast
views have the resources to answer the second of the above questions in
the positive.
Accordingly, one can see Alston as defending a version of the steadfast
view where the practitioners of the world religions can rationally hold
on to their views. In fact, the dialectic for his reasoning closely resembles
that of an argument that Peter van Inwagen once suggested in support of
his version of the steadfast view.17 Van Inwagen suggested that it would
be reasonable for him to stick to his views on free will after he and David
Lewis (who holds a different view) are fully apprised of their reasons and
arguments because he is in possession of some “incommunicable insight”
or intuition that Lewis, for all his acumen, lacks.
Alston can also be seen to be treading a similar path. Recall Alston’s
appeal to the notion of “internal support” for mystical doxastic practices and his contention that the discernment of the spiritual fruits of a
particular doxastic practice is open only to those who participate in that
practice. We can now see that “spiritual fruits” for Alston plays a similar
role that played by “incommunicable insights” for van Inwagen. Alston,
however, differs from van Inwagen in one respect. Unlike the latter, Alston
recognizes that other mystical doxastic practices also enjoy such internal
Alston, Perceiving God, 271.
See, for example, Feldman, “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement.”
16
See, for example, Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement” and Elga, “Reflection
and Disagreement.”
17
Van Inwagen, “It is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone.”
14
15
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support. To put it differently, while Alston recognizes the possibility of
mutually recognized reasonable disagreement in addition to reasonable
disagreement, van Inwagen only recognizes the latter.18 But if the problem
of religious diversity is to be seen as merely an instance of the disagreement
controversy, there is a much easier route in arriving at an Alston-style
steadfast view. To resist the conciliationist pressures that disagreement
exerts, one could simply dispute the claim that the parties to the dispute
are epistemic peers by either denying that one can determine the epistemic credentials of the purported peers or by denying that they share the
same body of evidence.19
The preceding considerations can provide the basis of a steadfast view
in the face of religious diversity along the lines advocated by Alston
without confounding the situation with issues involving practical rationality.20 But is the problem of religious diversity just an instance of the
problem of disagreement, namely, religious disagreement? For if it were,
Alston could no longer single out, as we saw, the problem of religious
diversity as a problem peculiar only to MP for disagreement is also rife
in SP. One possible way of defending Alston’s claim about the peculiarity
of religious disagreement is to look at its sources, not in the context of
philosophical discussions but, in the context of the inter-practice of MP
and the various conceptual schemes it involves. Indeed, there are passages
in Alston’s book where he seems to be doing just that. Since I am going to
defend a similar approach, it is worth briefly recounting what he says in
order to connect the conclusions of this part of the paper to the positive
view that will subsequently be developed.
Alston, as we have seen, is quite cognizant of the fact that while people
with different cultural backgrounds conceptualize their shared perceived
environments more or less in the same way, the practitioners belonging
18
Alston’s argument differs, however, from Van Inwagen’s for, while the sort of internal
support that Van Inwagen receives from his “incommunicable insight” is epistemic, the kind
of support that Alston receives from his “spiritual fruits” is, as we saw earlier, pragmatic. But
the kind of rationality at stake in the disagreement debate is obviously epistemic. So, once
again, it is not clear that Alston achieves his goal even when his argument is glossed in terms
of the disagreement debate.
19
The first alternative has two sources. First, one may argue that there are no disputes-independent ways of assessing the epistemic credentials of those who are party to religious
disagreements. Moreover, one can deny that the credentials that are often emphasized by
religious traditions are generally easily identifiable. As for the second alternative, one could
argue that, unlike one’s sensory experiences, the content of religious experiences cannot be
communicated by means of verbal testimony since, by hypothesis, Ultimate Reality is responded to, within various religious doxastic practices, through one’s peculiar conceptual
and interpretive schemes. Moreover, even in those cases where the report of mystical experiences more or less overlaps, the verbal report may fail to reflect the intensity or the veracity
of those experiences which are directly proportional to their probative force.
20
I am suggesting only that since Alston is focusing on the output beliefs, he could help
himself with the resources of the steadfast view to arrive at his desired conclusion. As long
as CMP can provide the required “internal support,” a Christian is within her rights to stick
to her views. Of course, it is a further question whether the steadfast view is eventually
coherent, especially if it also wants to recognize the possibility of mutually recognized reasonable disagreement.

THE COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY OF RELIGIOUS PERCEPTION

227

to different religious traditions conceive of the Ultimate in radically different ways. These differences exist even among theistic religions with
their “contrasting emphases on God’s justice or love [and] quite different
stories as to what God expects and requires of us, as to what his plans for
us are, and as to his activities in history.”21 Alston then poses the following
question: Even if we assume that, say, CMP is a genuine doxastic practice,
does it allow us to form new beliefs on the basis of its experiential input?
“It may be suspected,” he says, “that what the practice amounts to is just
reading one’s prior religious beliefs into a cognitively different experiential matrix, rather than forming new beliefs on the basis of experience.”22
To answer this question, Alston separates two concerns about the role
of conceptual frameworks: (1) one’s antecedently-possessed conceptual
scheme infiltrates one’s experience, and (2) one’s thereby fails to acquire
new beliefs. As regards the first charge, it is, says Alston, quite innocuous.
We typically make use of our familiar sensory concepts such as “houses,”
“trees,” and so on in perceiving our environment. SP and MP are on a par
as far as the intrusion of our background beliefs into our experiences are
concerned. As for the second charge, Alston notes that religious beliefs
often pertain to God’s specific relation to the individual perceiver to the
effect that He is, say, reproaching him, forgiving him and so on, which information the individual may have lacked before entering into perceptual
contact with God. Sometimes the individual only gets to reaffirm her already held belief through her experience with a loving God. But this kind
of updating is also present in SP with one of its effects being to strengthen
one’s justification for the belief in question. In the quoted passages above,
Alston comes very close to expressing one of the central ideas behind the
phenomenon of cognitive penetration, though he fails to bring out its epistemic implications.
3. Religious Diversity and the Problem of Cognitive Penetration
As I have already remarked, the thought behind the thesis of cognitive
penetration is that one’s belief system or antecedent mental states can
affect the epistemic potential of one’s experience, thus undermining the
justification that it would otherwise provide for the belief it gives rise to.
If true, this would undermine accounts of perceptual justification (like
dogmatism) that take the phenomenology of perception to underwrite
its justificatory potential. To explain, it is a familiar fact that what we
experience and perceive affect our beliefs, desires, and so on. What is controversial is whether the influence goes in the opposite direction, that is,
whether cognitive states (doxastic or nondoxastic) affect the contents of
our perceptual states. The thesis of the cognitive penetrability of perception holds that cognitive states influence the contents of perceptual states
such that it is nomologically possible for two subjects (or for a subject
21
22

Alston, Perceiving God, 191.
Alston, Perceiving God, 205 (my emphasis).
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at different times) to have visual experiences that have different contents
because of their beliefs, desires, or other cognitive states while their sensory inputs, the state of their sensory organ, and the orientation of their
attention are fixed.23
Of course, not every sort of effect on our experiences counts as a case
of cognitive penetration. When I turn my head in the direction of a noise
and consequently have a new set of experiences, that is not cognitive penetration. Rather, the epistemologically important cases of the cognitive
penetration of experience occur when some of the relevant factors such
as the conditions of sensory organs and the orientation of one’s attention
are fixed. Under these circumstances, it is possible for two subjects with
different prior cognitive states to end up of having experiences with different contents.24 Perhaps the most common cases of cognitive penetration
are those in which one’s desires affect one’s experiences by causally influencing them. Consider, for example, the following scenario (I will call it
Prospectors) where two gold prospectors, Gus and Virgil, are mining for
gold. Gus is an expert while Virgil is a novice. When they look at the shiny,
yellowish pebble in their pan, the nugget looks gold to both. However,
for Gus, it is his knowledge of the identifying marks of gold that makes
it seem to him as if the nugget is gold while, in the case of Virgil, it is his
desire to get rich that brings about the seeming.25 It is obvious that Virgil’s
case is one of wishful thinking as his seemings are caused by his desires
(of course he is not aware that he is engaging in wishful thinking). Here
are some further cases of cognitive penetration.
Angry-looking Jack. Jill thinks (falsely and without any reason) that Jack
is angry with her. Her belief makes her expect Jack to look angry. Thus,
when she sees Jack, her belief makes him look angry to her. If she could
be convinced of the error of her prior belief, she would see that Jack’s
posture is not one of anger.26
Sunset. In the evening, I view a reddish Sun over a river which looks
like a beautiful sunset to me. If I did not know that it was evening or
morning, it would not seem to me to be a sunset.27
Snake. My fear of snakes makes me more vigilant at detecting snakes
in my path. On the other hand, if my fear is strong, my heightened
awareness might make me see snakes almost everywhere.28

23
Macpherson, “Cognitive Penetration.” This definition does not cover perceptual
learning which is a different phenomenon.
24
This has resulted in broader and narrower conceptions of cognitive penetration. In this
paper, I shall work with both conceptions.
25
See Markie, “Epistemically Appropriate Perceptual Belief.”
26
Siegel, “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification.”
27
McGrath, “Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration.”
28
Lyons, “Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability.”
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The fundamental question that such cases pose is what sort of epistemic
influence can the psychological precursors of one’s perceptual experience
(such as beliefs, desires, etc.) have on that experience. There is no doubt
that in some cases of cognitive penetration (i.e., the “bad” ones), there is
something epistemically defective about the beliefs formed on the basis
of cognitively penetrated experiences. For example, in Angry-looking Jack,
Jill’s false and unjustified belief that Jack is angry with her causes her to
have the particular experience she has when she sees Jack. If she did not
have that belief, Jack would not look angry to her. Her experience is more
a reflection of her prior unjustified belief than a correct representation of
the way things are. That is why we are disinclined to regard her belief
about Jack’s attitude towards her formed (or updated) after seeing him as
justified. Intuitively, when Jill’s antecedent belief impacts her experience,
it would be unreasonable to expect the experience to provide support for
that very belief.
Or, consider the case of a vain performer whose vanity makes him believe that the (neutral) faces he sees in the audience are all pleased with
his performance. Again, since his experiences of those faces are influenced
by his vanity, it would be unreasonable of him to take his experiences as
providing justification for his view of himself. The situation described in
these examples is not unlike a gossip circle in which a subject (S1) tells
another subject (S2) that p which S2 believes but soon forgets where she
has got it from. Suppose S2 then reports to S1 that p. In such circumstances,
it would be odd for S1 to take S2’s testimony as further evidence for p beyond whatever evidence he had to start with.29 The cases described above
suggest that the etiology places constraints on when experience can generate justification for the belief it gives rise to. So, cognitive penetration
can impede the generation of justification by experience. That is precisely
why such a view is at odds with the dogmatist theories of perceptual
justification which claim that perceptual experiences provide prima facie
justification for the beliefs they cause.
But not all such cases are epistemically pernicious. In some (good) cases
(as in the case of Gus in Prospectors) the resulting experiences are enriched
by receiving more information. For a different example, consider the case
of a pine tree expert and a novice who are both looking at the same pine
tree. It would be plausible to think that the expert’s belief that that is a
pine tree is more justified than that of the non-expert since the expert’s
background knowledge puts more information into his experience.
It would not be unreasonable to blame the etiology of experience in
bad cases as being responsible for downgrading its justificatory force. Following Siegel,30 we call the thesis that the etiology of cognitively-penetrated
Siegel “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification.”
Siegel, “The Epistemic Impact.” We have seen how the cognitive penetrability thesis
threatens the dogmatist view. This seems to suggest that perhaps it is the internalist character of justification (endorsed in dogmatism), requiring the justifiers to be introspectively
accessible to the subject, that makes dogmatism vulnerable to the problem posed by the bad
29
30
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experiences can remove some of their justificatory force, “The Downgrade
Principle.” This claim is particularly convincing in cases where the penetrating state is a desire, for everyone would grant that beliefs that result
from wishful thinking are clear cases of unjustified beliefs. The idea is that
just as, say, wishful thinking, fearful thinking, and prejudice can generate
unjustified beliefs, so also wishful seeing, fearful seeing, and prejudiced
seeing can generate epistemically downgraded experiences that lack some
of the epistemic force that they would have had had they not been influenced by desire, fear and prejudice.31
Before I turn to how the cognitive penetrability thesis bears on the
problem of religious diversity and the epistemic status of religious beliefs, a few important points are in order. The first thing to note is that
in the typical cases of cognitive penetration, the subject is not aware of
the etiology of her experiences, or the epistemic status of her penetrating
states and their causal roles. Her experiences are downgraded if they are
influenced by her cognitive states such as beliefs, fears, desires, etc., in the
way described, even if she is not aware of that influence. Otherwise, bad
cases of cognitive penetration would be no different from the mundane
cases of belief formation involving defeaters. In Angry-looking Jack, for example, Jill does not know whether she is in a good or bad case. She need
not even be able to determine which case she is in. Otherwise, there would
be no puzzle to solve. The argument from cognitive penetration proceeds
on the assumption that the subjects are unaware of the influence of their
cases of cognitive penetration. In Angry-looking Jack, for example, Jill lacks conscious access to
her (prior) belief’s causal role. But it is important to note that not all versions of internalism
are negatively affected. There is, for example, a metaphysical version of internalism (“Mentalism”) according to which only the internal states of an agent at a given time determine
whether her beliefs are justified (see, for example, Conee and Feldman, “Internalism Defended”). Since mentalism remains neutral on the question whether these mental states need
be accessible to an agent, the etiology of experience can be an epistemic difference-maker.
Accordingly, if two people who happen to share the same kind of experience, but with different etiologies, cannot be epistemically identical because they have different total mental
states.
31
For the purposes of this paper I am going to assume the Downgrade Principle. Of
course, like other substantial philosophical theses, the Downgrade Principle is controversial.
But there are also a number of arguments in its support. One such argument (Vance, “Emotion and the New Epistemic Challenge”) focuses on emotions because emotions are quite
similar to experiences (in terms of having phenomenological character). On the other hand,
it is quite plausible to think that beliefs and other attitudes can cognitively penetrate emotional experiences. Furthermore, it is widely believed that emotions can be rational, justified
or unjustified. Accordingly, when an irrational belief penetrate an emotional experience, it
seems quite plausible to think that this emotion is not credible enough to justify the belief it
give rise to because, by virtue of its etiology, the emotion itself is irrational. The analogy with
emotions, thus, provides strong support for the Downgrade Principle. Another approach
(Lyons, “Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception”) appeals to
the reliability of the processes involving cognitively penetrated experiences themselves in
order to argue for the principle. Finally, Siegel (The Rationality of Perception) has argued at
length that perceptual experiences themselves could manifest an epistemic status i.e., be
rational or irrational in the same way that the beliefs are. It is also worth noting that the
ability of the Downgrade Principle to illuminate certain philosophical controversies such as
the liberalism/conservatism debate, and, if the thesis of this paper is correct, the problem of
religious diversity adds to its plausibility.
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cognitive states on their experience. Still, the etiology of their experiences
can affect their justification power so that the experiences fail to rationally
strengthen the subjects’ antecedent beliefs, fears, etc.
Moreover, as already indicated, the driving force behind the idea that
the epistemic status of experiences can be adversely affected by how they
are formed involves the sort of circularity that infects the subject’s transition
from her antecedent states (beliefs, fears, etc.) to her experiences and then
back to those states again. If one’s antecedent beliefs could influence one’s
experiences, it would be odd to take those experiences to provide support
for the beliefs in question. So it does not matter whether one’s antecedent
states are well-founded or not. As long as our cognitively penetrated experiences display the above circular pattern, they will be downgraded. To
give an example of such a cognitively penetrated experience, suppose, on
the basis of your lifetime experiences, you have formed the well-confirmed
belief that bananas are yellow. Suppose you then encounter a gray banana
which appears to you to be yellow. Here, it would seem unreasonable if
you were to take your newly acquired experience as providing further
support for your belief in the generalization that bananas are yellow. The
resulting experience is certainly not on epistemic par with your previous
experiences that accurately represented the color of the bananas you had
perceived. The reason is obvious. Your experience is being epistemically
downgraded because, by influencing your experience of the banana, your
(well-founded) antecedent belief prevents you from seeing its true color.32
Let us now see how the preceding remarks can illuminate the question
of the epistemic significance of religious diversity. For the sake of concreteness, as well as ease of management, I am restricting the scope of
religious diversity to monotheistic mystical practices (MMP). My principal
claim is that we can view the doxastic incompatibility that emerges from
Jewish, Christian and Islamic mystical practices as having its origin in the
phenomenon of cognitive penetration, and that whether or not such an
incompatibility is an indication that MMP is unreliable depends on how
widespread we take the doxastic incompatibility to be. Of course, given
the preceding observations, only the bad cases of the cognitive penetration of religious experience pose a threat to religious belief.33 To explain,
let us begin by considering what the good and bad cases of cognitive penetration look like within MMP.
Angry/Forgiving God. As Alston remarks, one finds contrasting emphases on God’s attributes such as justice or love in different religions.
Suppose then that there is a Muslim practitioner S1 (belonging to a very
For further arguments see Siegel, The Rationality of Perception.
In this paper, I am following the lead of philosophers like Alston and indeed the whole
tradition of reformed epistemology which emphasize the (relevant) similarities between
perception and religious experience. If it is conceded that both perception and religious experience can confer justification on the beliefs they give rise to, there is no a priori reason to
deny why the justification-conferring ability of religious experience cannot be undermined
by its etiology in the way perception’s ability is.
32
33
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strict sect within Islam) who believes that God is very unforgiving and
strict. Suppose S1 commits a sin in circumstances over which he does
not have much control. Subsequently he happens to have an experiential awareness of God in which He seems to be very angry with him.
Now consider S2, say, a highly liberal Muslim who takes God to be
very forgiving. She commits a sin that she could avoid if she had been
more diligent. Subsequently, she happens to have an awareness of God
in which He seems to be very loving and satisfied with her deed. In
both cases, S1’s and S2’s prior beliefs penetrate their mystical experience
rendering their beliefs about God’s attitudes towards themselves unjustified. In both cases, if they had been convinced of the falsity of their
prior beliefs, they would not have perceived God in the way they did.
God Incarnate. Just as in SP, where one’s expertise and background
knowledge can enrich one’s experience, thus, enhancing its justification potential, one’s expertise in the field of religion can also achieve
a similar result. Suppose two practitioners, S1 and S2, of two different
religions, say, Christianity and Islam, come to have experience of God
after following similar meditative techniques such as fasting, praying,
abstaining from worldly pleasures and so on. After a sufficient lapse of
time, our subjects come to have visions of God. S1 reports of “having
‘seen’ how God is three persons or how the divine and human natures
of Christ are united.”34 This is actually what Alston quotes St. Teresa as
having witnessed in one of her mystical experiences. The Muslim, on
the other, reports of having seen God as a unitary being and so on.
The first scenario can be considered a bad case of cognitive penetration
where the relevant mystical experiences are downgraded by prior mental
states resulting in unjustified output beliefs. The case of God-Incarnate is
good or bad depending on whether it is the Christian’s or the Muslim’s
background belief system that correctly represent God’s features. Whichever is correct, then the practitioner of that religion will be in the same
position that the pine tree expert was when looking at the pine tree.35 Her
background knowledge of God enriches her experiences of Him, thus,
enhancing its justification potential. As for the cases in which one’s prior
mental states bring about a shift of focus and attention, thereby, priming
one’s sensory perception while navigating in one’s environment, one can
refer to the spiritual techniques within different religions (like saying
prayers, etc. that are interwoven with their main beliefs). The aim of such
prayers and supplications is to prepare the believer for her spiritual quest
by priming her mystical perception to detect more efficiently the signals
that God sends her.
Quoted in Alston, Perceiving God, 207.
When a tree expert and a non-expert look at the same pine tree, the expert gets more justification to believe that the tree is a pine tree because the expert’s (phenomenally different)
experience has the content x is a pine tree. Their routes to their experiences are different. See
Siegel, The Rationality of Perception, 132.
34
35
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Now, if you look at the various forms of MMP, Jewish, Christian and
Islamic practices, through the prism of the thesis of cognitive penetration, we get radically different results in regard to the epistemic impact
of religious diversity than if the latter is merely taken to be an instance
of the problem of disagreement, namely, religious disagreement. To see
this, suppose there are two practitioners, S1 and S2, belonging to different
mystical practices, who attribute two contradictory properties to God in
response to their respective mystical experiences that are penetrated by
different background beliefs. Let us further assume that one of these sets
of background beliefs is false and unjustified resulting in the downgrade
of the relevant experience while the other actually enriches the content of
the subject’s mystical experience. S1 and S2 are subsequently apprised of
their differences. The question is how we should evaluate the epistemic
status of their beliefs.
To begin with, with a disagreement gloss on religious diversity, the
situation is as follows. S1 and S2 are justified in engaging in their practices
or in holding their incompatible beliefs before being apprised of their differences as long as those beliefs are proper responses to their respective
religious experiences. The question is whether S1 and S2 are still justified in
holding their beliefs after they become aware of the fact of religious diversity. On Alston’s account, they are still justified (though to a lesser degree
than if there was no such diversity) in holding on to their beliefs. On my
account, however, at least one of the practitioners is already unjustified
in his belief (even before disclosure), since, by hypothesis, his experience
is penetrated by a set of false and unjustified beliefs which detracts from
the reliability of the faculties that produced his belief. His case is one of
cognitive penetration where his mystical experience (downgraded as a
result of being penetrated by his prior mental states) fails to justify his
belief. Dogmatists or phenomenal conservatives, of course, take both S1
and S2 to be justified in their beliefs on account of their seemings. But if
the Downgrade Principle is correct, at least one of the seemings is being
downgraded as a result of constituting a bad case of cognitive penetration.
Moreover, Alston, we may recall, formulated the problem of religious
diversity for the rationality of religious belief in terms of whether religious diversity undermines the reliability of MP or MMP. On my account,
such a connection is by no means necessary. While cognitive penetration
also occurs in the sensory perceptual practice, it does not undermine the
reliability of SP. Likewise, there is no reason why we should take the
phenomenon of religious diversity, understood in terms of cognitive penetration, to undermine the reliability of MP. What should be conceded is
that if the phenomenon of cognitive penetration is widespread in sensory
practices involving mostly bad cases, then that would render sensory perception unreliable. Under these circumstances the sensory practice would
yield mostly false beliefs. In other words, if most of the cases of perceptual
belief formation turn out to be bad cases of cognitive penetration, that
would constitute a strong case against the reliability of perception.
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It might be thought that MP differs from SP in this respect. Doxastic
incompatibility is quite widespread among mystical doxastic practices. I
am inclined to agree with this claim. But I have already confined the scope
of diversity to monotheistic religions and it is by no means obvious that
within this range diversity outruns agreement. Alston himself admits that
here there is a great deal of doxastic overlap among theistic religions. I am
inclined to think that the diversity within MMP—at least with respect to
the core beliefs—is somewhat exaggerated. However, I am going to conclude my discussion with a conditional claim. If religious diversity within
MMP is not as widespread as it is made to appear, then, with the cognitive
penetration gloss on such diversity, MMP can still be regarded as reliable,
just as sensory perception is regarded as a reliable practice despite the phenomenon of cognitive penetration.36 Of course, there is still the problem
of what religious practitioners should do in the face of disagreement. But
that is a general problem that involves all sorts of belief-forming practices,
sensory or non-sensory, religious or nonreligious.37
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